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THE EFFECTS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL ADJUSTMENT
AND AGE ON INTERPERSONAL JUDGMENTS

by

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Dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of Doctor
of Philosophy in the Department of
Psychology in the Graduate School
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ABSTRACT

(Psychology-Clinical)

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Poorly adjusted and well-adjusted individuals made judgments of actors after each of several actions. This allowed an analysis of how individuals make and modify their interpersonal judgments. It was predicted that poorly adjusted individuals would have strong preconceived expectations of others which would interfere with their processing of social data. Thus, they were expected to be less discriminating in their interpersonal judgments than well-adjusted individuals. The interpersonal judgments of young children were also examined to allow an examination of developmental differences in this process of modifying interpersonal judgments.

In Experiment One, average second and fifth graders, and socially rejected fifth graders, observed four actors perform each of three actions. After each action performed, subjects judged how much they would like the actor and predicted the actor's future behavior. Rejected

children's predictions of future behavior were less contingent on the observed behavioral information than were predictions of average fifth graders, supporting the hypothesis that preconceived expectations of rejected children interfere with interpersonal judgments. Young children used recently presented information more in their judgments of liking than did older children. This was consistent with the hypothesis that young children overmodify their interpersonal judgments. The pattern of results for young children and older rejected children was very different, suggesting that the rejected children's relatively noncontingent predictions are not attributable to developmental lag.

In Experiment Two, depressed and nondepressed college students observed actors perform each of two actions. The results indicated that there are few differences in the interpersonal judgments of these students.

A vulnerability model was proposed to account for differences between individuals of different psychological adjustment levels. This model predicts that the expectations of poorly adjusted individuals interfere with judgments frequently, while the expectations of well-adjusted individuals interfere rarely. The rejected child is proposed to represent an intermediate point on this continuum, exhibiting some interference in judgments under particular circumstances. The depressed student represents a point close to the well-adjusted end of this continuum.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The interpersonal judge usually has a variety of information available for use in judgments of others. Judgments may be based on some combination of the data provided by the behavior of others, the situation, and preconceived notions of others. When new behavioral information becomes available, it is frequently possible to modify these judgments.

Behavioral information provides the interpersonal judge with data which allow him to discriminate effectively between others. When preconceived expectations of others are strong, these expectations may serve as the basis for interpersonal judgments and thus interfere with the use of behavioral data. To the extent that these expectations interfere with the processing of social data, the individual is a less discriminating interpersonal judge.

The present work investigates how well-adjusted and poorly adjusted individuals use behavioral information in making and modifying their interpersonal judgments. It was hypothesized that the poorly adjusted individual has strong preconceived notions of others which serve as the basis for interpersonal judgments. These expectations interfere with the

processing of social data, such that the individual does not discriminate effectively between others on the basis of available behavioral information.

Changes that occur with development in the process of making and modifying interpersonal judgments are also examined in these experiments. These developmental changes have been investigated very little and are of interest in their own right. In addition, it seems critical that the normal development of the processes of interest be explored when attempting to understand differences between well-adjusted and poorly adjusted individuals. It is then possible to determine the relationship of this poorly functioning individual to the normal sequence of development. That is, the question of whether differences in the social cognitions of the poorly functioning individual are a function of developmental lag or of development getting "off course" can be examined.

Differences Related to Psychological Adjustment

Carson (1969) suggested that individuals differ in the extent to which they expect interpersonal experiences to be homogeneous. According to Carson, the extent to which the individual expects his interpersonal experiences to be homogeneous affects the level of accuracy in his interpersonal judgments. To the extent that expectations of others are flexible and heterogeneous, one can attend to, and use, the behavioral information provided by others in making interpersonal judgments. Conversely, to the extent that expectations are rigid and homogeneous, one cannot use the behavioral information provided. Rather, one uses preconceived notions

of the other as the basis for judgments. Thus, the result is that the individual with rigid expectations is less accurate in his interpersonal perceptions and less able to discriminate effectively between individuals because he cannot benefit from information available in his environment. His interpersonal experiences, therefore, are homogeneous and confirm his expectations of the world.

Snyder, Tanke, and Berscheid (1977) demonstrated, with normal subjects, the effect expectations could have on interpersonal perception. Subjects who developed expectations about others before interacting with these others failed to look for behavioral data which would disconfirm their expectations. In particular, when male students were led to expect that they would be interacting verbally with an attractive female, they perceived the individual as much more interesting, articulate, and sociable, than when they were led to expect that they would be interacting with an unattractive female.

Dodge (1980) also demonstrated the effect differential expectations may have on perception, in research with aggressive and nonaggressive children. The aggressive children perceived other children's intentions as hostile when the consequences of the others' actions were negative and intentions were ambiguous. Nonaggressive children were more likely to perceive intentions as benign under such circumstances. While differences in expectations were not directly assessed in this study, one might infer that differences in expectations of the children resulted in different interpretations of the event.

In addition to perceiving interpersonal experiences as consistent with one's expectations, individuals with rigid expectations have other means of confirming these expectations. It is possible that they behave in ways which elicit the expected responses from others. According to Carson (1969), certain behaviors regularly elicit predictable responses.

Leary (1957) proposed that the poorly adjusted individual succeeds in eliciting expected responses from others because he regularly exhibits behaviors which are powerful elicitors of other predictable behaviors. According to Leary, it is extremely important to the individual that others confirm his expectations because these expectations are so inflexible.

The Snyder et al. (1977) experiment provides a demonstration of the complicated interplay between expectations, perception, and behavior. Results indicated that, not only did males perceive females as more attractive when they had been led to believe they would be attractive, but the females in this experimental condition also behaved in a more attractive fashion. It seems that these males elicited behavior which was consistent with their expectations, and thus had their expectations confirmed.

Similarly, Rausch, Dittman, and Taylor (1959) demonstrated, with aggressive boys, the regularity with which certain behaviors are elicited by other behaviors. These data were obtained from naturalistic observations, and the expectations of the boys were, therefore, not manipulated, as they were in the Snyder et al. experiment (1977). Rausch et al. found that particular behaviors of the boys rather consistently elicited

predictable complementary behaviors from others. If it is assumed that the boys expected to elicit behaviors complementary to their own, their expectations were confirmed. For example, hostile behaviors of the boys elicited hostile responses from others. If the boys expected others to behave in a hostile manner, these expectations were confirmed.

On the basis of the rather limited research findings available, it seems that individual differences in expectations of others may differentially affect interpersonal perception and behavior. These findings suggest that individuals with particularly rigid expectations of their interpersonal worlds may perceive experiences as consistent with these expectations and behave in ways which elicit the expected responses. This, in turn, could lead to the confirmation of their expectations.

Developmental Differences

In the social world of the child, there is a wide range of information available for use in most interpersonal judgments. How children use the various sorts of information available in their general evaluations of others and predictions of future behavior is considered in the sections below.

General evaluations of others. Piaget (1932) has suggested that young children tend to "center" on one piece of information in their judgments, rather than weigh the several pieces of available information equally. For example, in his work in moral development, Piaget found that young children "centered" on consequence information and ignored intent information. Results of an experiment conducted by Feldman,

Klosson, Parson, Rholes, and Ruble (1976) suggest that Piaget's results were a function of a recency effect in young children's use of information. While young children "centered" on one of two pieces of information, the information focused upon was the most recent piece of information, rather than a particular type of information. When memory was controlled for by asking children to recall relevant information presented, the greater recency effect for young children was eliminated (Austin, Ruble, & Trabasso, 1977). These results suggest that the recency effect frequently found for young children is attributable to the poorer memories of young children and not to a preference for the most recently presented information.

Researchers in the area of information integration theory (e.g., Anderson & Butzin, 1978; Anderson & Cuneo, 1978; Butzin, 1978; Butzin & Anderson, 1973; Leon, 1977) have demonstrated that young children are able to attend to, and use, several pieces of information in making their judgments. For example, Butzin and Anderson found children as young as 4 able to integrate three pieces of information in their social judgments.

The results of Butzin and Anderson (1973) indicate that young children are cognitively capable of integrating several pieces of information in their judgments. The work of Austin et al. (1977) suggests that, while capable, it is likely that young children will attend to the most recent piece of information more than older children because their memories for earlier pieces of information are poorer. Nonetheless, if memory is

controlled for, there should be no differences in the judgments of young and older children. That is, according to Ruble et al., young children do not prefer using the last piece of information; they have trouble remembering earlier pieces.

However, in pilot work conducted by Butzin and Dozier (Note 1), 5-year-old children tended to "over-update" their interpersonal judgments, even though their memory for earlier information seemed certain. When young children were asked to judge the niceness of classmates who performed an act, these judgments were a function of the particular act performed only. They were relatively independent of their prior judgments indicating how much they liked the classmate. These pilot data suggest that young children may prefer using the most recent behavioral information in their interpersonal judgments.

In Experiment One, two age groups of children were used to test this hypothesis that younger children "over-update" their social judgments. It was predicted that young children would attend more to the most recent piece of information than older children, despite the inclusion of procedures to assure that children remembered earlier information.

Predictions of behavior. General evaluations of others and predictions of the behavior of others would seem to be very closely related judgments. In particular, it seems that predictions of behavior are usually contingent upon more general judgments of the characteristics of the other. This is generally supported in the literature (e.g., Bem & Allen, 1974; Cronbach, 1955).

There may be exceptions to this contingent relationship between predictions of behavior and judgments of others, however. Rotenberg (1980) studied children's use of intentionality in their judgments of the characteristics of others and in their predictions of the behavior of others. While the youngest children judged the characteristics of others in the same way as older children, their predictions of behavior differed from older children's predictions. According to Rotenberg, these predictions were not contingent upon their judgments of the characteristics of others. He claimed that young children's failure to use available behavioral data to predict future behavior suggested that they do not have notions of stable personality dispositions.

However, Rotenberg's experiment may not have adequately tested young children's capabilities. Rotenberg presented children with information about how mean other children had been and asked them to predict how nice these children would be in the future. It may be that meanness and niceness are separate unipolar dimensions, rather than opposite ends of a bipolar dimension. For example, if a person is "not at all nice," it does not necessarily follow that he is "very mean." Some behavioral data support this notion that meanness and niceness are, functionally, separate unipolar dimensions (Dodge, 1980; Feshbach & Feshbach, 1969; Yarrow & Waxler, 1976). Dodge found that, while aggressive children were more likely than nonaggressive children to be "mean" (messing up another's puzzle when provoked), they were also more likely to be "nice" (helping put together other's puzzle).

It seems that Rotenberg's data are inconclusive regarding young children's use of available information in predicting future behavior. His results may simply indicate that, for young children, meanness and niceness are separate dimensions.

The Present Investigation

The reported experiments tested the hypothesis that, as compared with well-adjusted individuals, individuals who are poorly adjusted have different expectations of others which differentially affect their use of available behavioral data. It was hypothesized that the expectations of these poorly adjusted individuals are relatively inflexible, causing them to underuse available data in their interpersonal judgments.

The particular groups of poorly adjusted individuals investigated here were socially rejected children and depressed college students. The well-adjusted peers of individuals in these groups served as comparison groups. The groups were selected from a wide range of possibilities, primarily because of the relatively straightforward selection criteria and ready availability of subjects, as compared with other groups. While the particular responses of the various possible populations would surely be different, it seemed plausible that some basic patterns might be shared in common.

A group of young children was also used to allow an assessment of developmental changes in the process of modifying interpersonal judgments. It was hypothesized that young children rely on the behavioral data

which are temporally most immediate. While young children have been found to attend to, and integrate, several pieces of information (e.g., Butzin & Anderson, 1973), it was hypothesized that they demonstrate a preference for the most recent information in their real-world interpersonal judgments.

It was predicted that the patterns of differences between rejected children and well-adjusted children and between young children and older children would not be comparable. This would suggest that the development of the poorly adjusted child has gotten "off course" and is not simply a function of cognitive or social immaturity.

The interpersonal judgments investigated here are general evaluations of others and predictions of future behavior. The methodology employed allows an examination of initial judgments of others following the presentation of a single piece of information, and updated judgments following the presentation of additional information.

CHAPTER II

EXPERIMENT ONE

This experiment examined how children make general evaluations and predictions of others, and how they modify these evaluations and predictions with new information. Children of two ages were used as subjects to allow an investigation of developmental differences in this process of modifying interpersonal judgments. Children of the same age who were socially rejected or socially well adjusted were used to allow an investigation of individual differences related to social and psychological adjustment.

Subjects were presented with three pieces of videotaped information about each of four other children. The subjects were led to believe that the children seen on videotapes were in adjoining laboratory rooms. Following each observed action, subjects indicated how much they thought they would like the actor and predicted how the actor would behave in a particular situation in the future.

Videotaped actions were used in this experiment because it was critical to hypotheses tested that stimuli be believable and ecologically valid. Chandler, Greenspan, and Barenboim (1973) demonstrated that, when unrealistic stimuli are used, young children's capabilities can be under-

estimated. In particular, Chandler et al. found that young children made more mature moral judgments when judging actors presented on videotape than when judging characters in verbally presented stories. In addition, the hypothesized differences in the interpersonal judgments of well-adjusted and poorly adjusted children are thought to be limited to judgments in realistic social encounters. Therefore, such differences could only be detected in an experimental setting if the stimuli are realistic.

Response measures which could be easily understood and remembered, and which did not require a verbal response, were selected. Subjects judged how much they would like other children by choosing a point on a rating scale. Children as young as 4 have been found capable of using this and other similar rating scales successfully (Butzin, 1978; Butzin & Anderson, 1973). Children predicted the future behavior of actors by indicating how many pennies they thought actors would give to them. This was a straightforward and concrete task, which was easily understood by children. Both response measures were quantifiable and allowed an analysis of children's use and integration of the information presented.

Method

Overview of Experimental Design

Subjects saw each of four child actors perform three actions on videotape. After observing each action, subjects were asked to indicate how much they thought they would like the actor and to predict the actor's future behavior. Thus, subjects made three judgments of each actor and

three predictions of the behavior of each actor. These responses allow an examination of children's use of new information in updating general evaluation of others and in updating predictions of the behavior of others.

Subjects

Subjects were second-grade and fifth-grade children of average social status, and socially rejected fifth-grade children. The mean age of the second-grade group was 7 years 6 months, ranging from 6-8 to 8-0. The mean age of the fifth-grade group of average social status was 11-0, ranging from 10-5 to 11-9. For the rejected fifth graders, the mean age was 11-3, ranging from 10-7 to 12-1. There were 10 children in each group, half boys and half girls. All children were black and of lower or lower-middle socioeconomic status.

The groups of fifth-grade children were selected on the basis of peer nomination, in work conducted by Coie and Krehbiel (Note 2), as described below.

In each of two school years (third and fourth grades), students were asked to identify the three children in their class whom they liked most and the three whom they liked least. For each child, the number of times he was nominated as liked most and the number of times nominated as liked least were computed. The transformed z score for liked least nominations was subtracted from the transformed z score for liked most nominations, yielding a popularity score for each child.

Only those fifth graders obtaining popularity scores below the 8th percentile during fourth grade and below the 18th percentile during third grade were used as subjects in the rejected group. Fifth-grade subjects in the average social status group obtained scores between the 32nd and 85th percentile during third and fourth grade.

Sociometric data were not available for second graders. Therefore, teachers were asked to indicate whether the children tested fell among the most popular 10% or least popular 10% of children in the class. Any such children were excluded.

Procedure

Each subject was brought into a laboratory room equipped with a videotape monitor. He was told that he would see videotapes of children doing things in other rooms and would be asked to say how much he thought he would like the other child and to guess how many pennies the other child would give him.

The scale used for liking judgments was explained first. This was a set of 12 smiling faces, increasing in curvature by 2 mm each from a flat line on the left end to a smile curving 2.4 cm on the right end (Butzin & Anderson, 1973). The subject was told that the more he thought he would like the other child, the larger the smile he should select. The experimenter asked the subject several practice questions, assuring that he understood the scale and stimuli, and was able to use the rating scale.

The subject was then shown 15 pennies. He was told that, after every action observed on videotape, he would be asked to indicate how many of the 15 pennies the other child would give him. He was told that he would be rewarded for correct or nearly correct responses. If he guessed exactly right, he received 5 extra pennies. If his guess was off by 1 penny, he received 3 extra pennies; and if his guess was off by 2, he received 1 extra penny.

The subject was then told that the experimenter would go to another room to videotape a child who would decide how many tootsie rolls to give to him.

When the experimenter returned, the subject saw one of the following videotaped actions.

Experimenter (same for both actors): I want you to divide these tootsie rolls between yourself and the kid in the next room. It's up to you how many you keep and how many you give to the other kid.

Actor (High Nice): I'll give the other kid most of them (pushes eight tootsie rolls across table).

Actor (Low Nice): I like tootsie rolls. I'll just give the other kid a couple (pushes two across table).

The subject was then asked to indicate how much he thought he would like the actor by choosing a smile on the rating scale, and to guess how many pennies the actor would choose to give to him. This procedure was repeated for each of the three actions performed by each of the four actors.

After observing the second and third actions and before judgments were made, subjects were asked to recall the first and second (or first,

second, and third) actions. The experimenter reminded the child of any action not remembered and complete test of recall was repeated.

For the second action, the subject observed one of the following videotaped actions:

Experimenter (same for both actors): There's a big mess here on this board. I'll give you and the kid in the next room 10¢ each for cleaning it up. It's up to you how much you clean up and how much you leave for the other kid. You'll get 10¢ as long as you pick up anything and the other kid will get 10¢ for picking up the rest.

Actor (High Nice): I'll clean up most of it. I'll bet the kid in the other room won't want to clean it up (begins cleaning).

Actor (Low Nice): I think I'll just clean up a little. I don't like cleaning up messes (picks up several things and stops).

For the third action, the subject observed the following:

Experimenter: There are six balls in this pinball machine. It's up to you how many of those balls you play and how many you let the kid in the other room play.

Actor (High Nice): I'll let him play most of the balls. I bet he likes to play games like this (plays two balls).

Subjects observed four actors perform three behaviors each. The first two behaviors performed by the actors were constructed from a 2 x 2 (serial position 1 x serial position 2) factorial design. The two levels of each factor were high (H) and low (L) levels of niceness. The two levels of niceness for the tootsie roll task were giving away lots of tootsie rolls (H) and giving away just a couple (L). The two levels for the mess task were cleaning up most of the mess (H) and just a little (L). The first two actors performed the tootsie roll task first, and the second two actors performed the mess task first. Subjects observed the four actors in one of

the following four sequences: HL, HH, LL, LH; HH, LL, LH, HL; LL, LH, HL, HH; LH, HL, HH, LL. The third act observed was the same for all actors (High Nice action--actor giving away lots of balls on the pinball machine).

Results

All analysis of variance results reported are significant at an alpha level of .05. Preliminary analyses revealed no effects for sex or order of presentation. Further analyses collapsed across these factors.

Procedures for analyses of developmental effects and social status effects were identical. Developmental effects were assessed by comparing the responses of well-adjusted second and fifth graders, while social status effects were assessed by comparing the responses of average fifth graders and socially rejected fifth graders.

Developmental Effects

General evaluations of others. Subjects made judgments of each of four actors following the performance of each of three actions. Only the first two actions provided subjects with information useful in discriminating between actors. The third action was a constant, observed for all actors.

First judgments were analyzed by single factor within-subject analyses of variance. Second and fifth graders rated the actor who had performed a "nice" action higher on the liking scale than the actor who

had performed a "not-nice" action, $F(1, 9) = 38.28$ and 50.21 , respectively.

After being presented with a second piece of behavioral information about actors, subjects again made judgments of how much they liked the actors. Analysis of responses allows an examination of how children used the two pieces of information available about actors in making their judgments.

For each of the two age groups, 2×2 (1st Information Presented $\times$ 2nd Information Presented) within-subject analyses of variance were performed to assess children's use of information in making their second judgments. A main effect of 1st Information Presented for second graders, $F(1, 9) = 11.71$, and for fifth graders, $F(1, 9) = 14.72$, indicates that children used the first information presented in making their second judgments.

Responses are graphically demonstrated in the first two panels of Figure 1. The two levels of the first piece of information presented are represented on the abscissa. Thus, the slopes of the lines indicate children's use of this information in making second judgments. For second graders and fifth graders, the upward slopes of the lines indicate that an actor who performed a "nice" action first was rated higher on the liking scale than the actor who performed a "not-nice" action first, when




Figure 1. Mean 2nd Judgments of Liking: Experiment One. The levels of 1st Information Presented are represented on abscissa. The two levels of 2nd Information Presented are represented by two separate lines in each panel.

the second action performed was held constant.

A main effect of the 2nd Information Presented, $F(1, 9) = 45.47$ and 54.98 , for second and fifth graders, respectively, demonstrates that children also used the second piece of information presented in making these judgments of actors.

The two levels of the second piece of information presented are represented by the two separate lines in the upper panels of Figure 1. The vertical separation of the lines reflects children's use of this information in making judgments. Thus, both second and fifth graders rate an actor who has performed a "nice" second action higher on the liking scale than an actor who has performed a "not-nice" second action, when the first action is held constant.

Subjects' use of these two pieces of information about actors was also examined following the presentation of a third piece of information. All four stimulus actors performed the same third action, providing subjects with no new information which could help discriminate between actors. Thus, data analysis for third judgments was identical to analysis for second judgments. Again, second and fifth graders used the first information presented, $F(1, 9) = 30.21$ and 30.00 , respectively, and the second information presented, $F(1, 9) = 8.03$ and 11.88 , respectively. The first two panels of Figure 2 graphically demonstrate children's use of these pieces of information.

Differences between the groups of second and fifth graders were




Figure 2. Mean 3rd Judgments of Liking: Experiment One. The levels of 1st Information Presented are represented on abscissa. The two levels of 2nd Information Presented are represented by two separate lines in each panel.

analyzed by a $2 \times 2 \times 2$ (Age $\times$ 1st Information Presented $\times$ 2nd Information Presented) mixed factorial design. Age was the between-subject factor, while 1st Information and 2nd Information were within-subject factors.

As predicted, when subjects had been presented with two pieces of information, the younger children attended more to the recently presented information than did the older children, as reflected in a significant Age $\times$ 2nd Information interaction, $F(1, 18) = 5.00$. Figure 3 graphically demonstrates this interaction. If the two age groups were assigning equal weight to this factor in their judgments, the lines would be parallel. The crossover demonstrates that the more extreme group (the second-grader group) was using this factor more. This is consistent with the hypothesis that young children over-update their judgments of others with new information. At the time of the third judgments, there were no significant differences between the judgments of young children and older children.

Predictions of behavior. Procedures for analysis of predictions were identical to the procedures used for analysis of general evaluations. As in their general evaluations of others, when children had been presented with only one piece of information about actors, they predicted that the actor who had performed a "nice" action would give them more pennies than the actor who had performed a "not-nice" action, $F(1, 9) = 9.84$ and 44.13 , for second and fifth graders, respectively.




Figure 3. Mean Liking Judgments of Actors Who Performed Different Second Behaviors: Experiment One. The levels of 2nd Information Presented are represented on abscissa. The two groups of children are represented by two separate lines in each panel.

When presented with a second piece of information, second and fifth graders used the first information presented, $F(1, 9) = 5.29$ and 18.74 , respectively, and the second information presented, $F(1, 9) = 13.32$ and 28.80 , respectively, in predicting the behavior of actors. The first two panels of Figure 4 graphically demonstrate these effects.

After subjects had been presented with a third piece of information, they continued to attend to the first piece of information presented, $F(1, 9) = 7.97$ and 47.24 , for second and fifth graders, respectively. The effect of the second piece of information was not significant for either group. (See first two panels of Figure 5.)

There were no significant differences between second and fifth graders in any of the predictions made.

Social Status Effects

General evaluations of others. As with well-adjusted children, rejected children rated the actor who initially performed a "nice" action higher on the liking scale than the actor who initially performed a "not-nice" action, $F(1, 9) = 44.55$. They used the information presented initially and subsequently in their second judgments, $F(1, 9) = 6.32$ and 27.74 , and third judgments, $F(1, 9) = 12.06$ and 10.19 . (See third panel of Figures 1 and 2.)

There were no significant differences between judgments of socially rejected and well-adjusted children for the first, second, or third judgments.




Figure 4. Mean 2nd Predictions of Future Behavior: Experiment One. The levels of 1st Information Presented are represented on abscissa. The two levels of 2nd Information Presented are represented by two separate lines in each panel.




Figure 5. Mean 3rd Predictions of Future Behavior: Experiment One. The levels of 1st Information Presented are represented on abscissa. The two levels of 2nd Information Presented are represented by two separate lines in each panel.

Predictions of behavior. Rejected children used the first piece of information presented in making their initial predictions of the behavior of others, $\underline{F}(1, 9) = 25.63$. They also used the first piece of information and second piece of information in making their second predictions, $\underline{F}(1, 9) = 11.51$ and 14.08 , respectively. (See third panel of Figure 4.) While well-adjusted children attended to the first piece of information in making their third predictions, $\underline{F}(1, 9) = 47.24$, the effects of the first and second pieces of information were not significant for rejected children. (See third panel of Figure 5.)

The first panel of Figure 6 graphically demonstrates that rejected children, as compared with well-adjusted children, attended less to the first piece of behavioral data presented in making their initial predictions of future behavior, $\underline{F}(1, 18) = 4.54$. The slope of the line for well-adjusted children is steeper than the line for rejected children, demonstrating that well-adjusted children use this factor more in making their predictions.

When presented with a second piece of behavioral data, rejected children continued to use the first piece of information less in their predictions than well-adjusted children, as indicated by a Social Status $\times$ 1st Information interaction, $\underline{F}(1, 18) = 4.35$. (See second panel of Figure 6.)

These results are consistent with the hypothesis that the predictions of rejected children are less contingent upon information available




Figure 6. Mean Predictions for Actors Who Performed Different Initial Behaviors: Experiment One. The levels of 1st Information Presented are represented on abscissa. The two groups of children are represented by two separate lines in each panel.

than the predictions of well-adjusted children.

There were no significant differences between the third predictions of rejected and well-adjusted children.

Discussion

Developmental Effects

Young children, as compared with older children, used recently presented information more in their judgments of liking for others. This finding supports the hypothesis that young children tend to "over-update" their judgments of others as they obtain new information about these others.

This "over-updating" effect for young children is not predicted on the basis of moral judgment research conducted by Austin et al. (1977). Austin et al. found that, when young children were asked to recall the information presented before making judgments, they attended to recent information no more than older children. It was assumed that the frequently found recency effect was a function of the poorer memories of younger children. However, there was a greater recency effect found for young children than older children in the present study despite the inclusion of procedures to assure that children remembered stimuli. This suggests that, when a young child makes judgments of a child with whom he is actually interacting, he attends more to the behavior recently observed than do older children. This occurs even though the young child is capable of using both pieces of information in the way that older children do. It seems

that young children choose not to "hold a grudge" (or remember a positive evaluation).

The obtained results fail to support Rotenberg's (1980) position that young children do not have notions of stable personality dispositions. Rotenberg based his claim on the finding that young children were unable to predict the future behavior of others on the basis of behavioral information available.

In the present study, as in Rotenberg's work, young children's initial judgments looked quite similar to initial judgments of older children. When information was presented subsequently, younger children tended to overuse the new information in forming their judgments. These data could be considered consistent with Rotenberg's position that young children do not have notions of stable personality dispositions.

However, the predictions of younger children in the present study were generally contingent upon information available. These differences in the results of the reported experiment and Rotenberg's experiment might be attributable to one of several methodological differences. First, in the present study, the behavioral information presented to children and the behaviors predicted by children belonged to the same unipolar dimension. In Rotenberg's experiment, children may have had to generalize from one dimension to another to predict behaviors. Secondly, the stimuli presented to subjects were realistic and ecologically valid in the proposed study, and were not in Rotenberg's study. Chandler et al. (1973) have demonstrated

that young children's capabilities can be underestimated when the stimuli are not realistic. Third, the youngest group of subjects used in the reported study were second graders, while the youngest group in Rotenberg's study were kindergartners. However, the second graders used were primarily of low socioeconomic status, as compared with kindergartners of upper-middle socioeconomic status in Rotenberg's study. This difference in ages does not seem significant because of the more advanced social and cognitive development of the relatively advantaged children. Nonetheless, it seems important to assess the capabilities of younger children to predict behaviors, employing the methodology of the present study.

The present data indicate that young children do have notions of personality dispositions, but modify their evaluations readily with new data. That is, they seem quite able to use data they consider relevant to predict an individual's future behavior. They are, however, likely to consider as relevant the individual's most recent behavior, with other available behavioral data considered less relevant.

Social Status Effects

As expected, the predictions socially rejected children made of the behavior of others were less contingent upon information available to them than the predictions of average children. Their predictions were based less on the discriminating information provided by the behavior of the other than were the predictions of well-adjusted children.

It was hypothesized that the rigid and extreme expectations of rejected children would interfere with their use of behavioral data in judging others. In particular, these extreme expectations were predicted to serve as the basis for judgments. The results support the hypothesis that the predictions of rejected children are less contingent upon available behavioral data than the predictions of well-adjusted children. However, the hypothesis that rejected children share a common expectation of others which serves as the basis for judgments is not supported. If extreme expectations of others served as a basis for rejected children's judgments, it would be expected that these judgments would be extreme. The mean predictions of rejected children are less extreme than the predictions of well-adjusted children. For example, the average prediction of the number of pennies awarded by the "nice" actor was lower than predicted by well-adjusted children. The average prediction of the number of pennies awarded by the "not-nice" actor was higher than predicted by well-adjusted children (see Figure 4).

While the group means demonstrate that rejected children do not share a common bias, it is possible that some children have positive biases and some negative biases. In fact, 3 of the 10 rejected children had mean scores higher than any presented by well-adjusted children, and 3 had scores lower than any presented by well-adjusted children. This, in fact, suggests that some rejected children may have strong positive expectations of others, while others have strong negative expectations.

While the predictions of rejected children were less contingent upon behavioral data than the predictions of well-adjusted children, their judgments of liking were similar to the judgments of their well-adjusted peers. Differences in the experimental tasks suggest several possible explanations for this pattern of results.

In the evaluation task, children were asked to indicate how much they would like other children. In the prediction task, the children were asked to predict what other children would do to them, with correct responses rewarded. The question changed functionally from "what is this kid like?" to "what will this kid do to me?" Rejected and nonrejected children responded similarly to the question "what is this kid like?" but dissimilarly to the question "what will this kid do to me?"

When the subject is asked how someone will behave toward him, the level of personal involvement, or "ego involvement," seems greater than when the subject simply evaluates the other. When assessing how someone will behave towards him, it seems that the subject's feelings about himself are invoked. For example, in making judgments, he might consider how others usually behave toward him and how he thinks he deserves to be treated.

When the rejected child considers such things as how others usually behave towards him, it seems that he loses sight of the particular others with whom he is interacting. These expectations of generalized others interfere with the processing of data. When he can remain detached from

a task, however, it seems that these expectations are not invoked. At such times, the available data can be used effectively.

It has been argued that children performed differently on the two experimental tasks because a greater level of personal involvement was required on one task than on the other. However, there are other differences between the experimental tasks which may have been responsible for the findings. The obvious difference between the tasks is that subjects were asked to evaluate other children in one task and predict behavior in another. It could be that, for some reason, rejected children are generally less skillful at predicting the behavior of others than are well-adjusted children. Rotenberg (1980) proposed that, if a child does not have an understanding of stable personality dispositions, he will be unable to make discriminating predictions of future behavior. It is possible that the rejected child's notions of personality dispositions are less stable than those of the well-adjusted child. It seems that the failure to develop notions of stable personality dispositions might result from the child's experiencing a relatively unpredictable social world. That is, he may have failed to learn how to predict the behavior of others because others behaved unpredictably.

A third difference in the two tasks is that the child was rewarded for "correct" responses in the prediction task and was not rewarded in the evaluation task. It could be that rejected children, as compared with well-adjusted children, responded differently to the risk involved in the task.

It seems that the most likely explanation for the obtained results is that children reacted differently to the different levels of personal involvement required by the tasks. This explanation is consistent with the hypothesis that the rejected child's expectations of others interfere with his use of behavioral information in social judgments.

Data could be collected which would discriminate between these several explanations for the obtained results. Children could be asked to predict the behavior of other children with whom they were not interacting. The theory that rejected children become less discriminating social judges when there is greater "ego involvement" predicts no differences between rejected and nonrejected children on this task. The judgments of rejected children would be expected to be as contingent on the available behavioral data as the judgments of nonrejected children because the task requires little personal involvement. However, if rejected children have general difficulties in predicting the behavior of others, their predictions should be less contingent on the data than the predictions of well-adjusted children.

If different levels of personal involvement affect the judgments of rejected children, it would be expected that greater levels of personal involvement would produce greater effects on judgments. Thus, if the rejected child were to predict how another would behave toward him when the two were involved in face-to-face interaction, for example, his predictions should be less contingent on available data than in the present experiment.

The pattern of results obtained for rejected children differs from results obtained for young children. The general evaluations of young children were over-updated, when compared with well-adjusted fifth graders, while the general evaluations of rejected children were generally similar to the judgments of well-adjusted fifth graders. The predictions of young children were similar to the predictions of fifth graders, while the predictions of rejected children were less contingent upon available information. These results suggest that rejected children's difficulties in making particular social judgments cannot be explained as resulting from developmental lag. Rather, it seems that they have gotten off the normal course of development.

For whatever reason rejected children have gotten off the normal developmental course, the consequences for their interpersonal encounters are serious. If these children do not use information available about others effectively to make predictions of how those others will behave toward them in the future, their social worlds will be highly unpredictable and uncontrollable. Most children seem to develop a well-differentiated sense of how particular teachers will behave, how particular peers will behave, how their parents will behave, etc. If this system is not well differentiated, the child's behavior will often be inappropriate because he will fail to anticipate the forthcoming behaviors from others. For example, if he does not expect different behaviors from a classmate who likes him and a classmate who dislikes him, he will be as likely to approach one child as the other and as likely to be rejected as accepted.

CHAPTER III

EXPERIMENT TWO

This experiment examined the manner in which well-adjusted and poorly adjusted adults make and update their interpersonal judgments. While the stimuli, judgments, and criteria for selection of subjects were different in Experiments One and Two, an attempt was made to make the experiments comparable. In both experiments subjects observed the behavior of peers and made judgments and predictions of these peers. One group of subjects in each experiment was identified as well adjusted, and one was identified as poorly adjusted.

Some changes in the methodology of Experiment One were made so as to make the situation as believable to adults as possible. The experiments differed in the following ways: The particular behaviors observed and predicted by adults were different from those observed and predicted by children. Adults observed others through a one-way mirror, rather than on videotape. Adults observed each actor perform only two actions, rather than the three observed by children.

Selection criteria for subjects were also quite different in the two experiments. The children were black and primarily of lower and lower-

middle socioeconomic status. Adults were white students enrolled in an expensive, private university. The poorly functioning group of children was selected because they were rejected by their peers, while the poorly functioning group of adults was selected because they endorsed items on a questionnaire indicating that they felt depressed.

Method

Overview of Experimental Design

Subjects saw each of four adult actors perform two actions through a one-way mirror. After observing each action, subjects were asked to indicate how much they thought they would like the actor and to predict the actor's future behavior.

Subjects

Subjects were 20 college students enrolled in an introductory psychology course at Duke University. Half of the subjects were identified as depressed and half were identified as well adjusted. For each group, 2 of the 10 subjects were male and 8 were female.

Selection of subjects was made on the basis of two self-report measures, in the manner described below.

All students enrolled in introductory psychology courses at Duke University were administered a seven-item questionnaire (Appendix J). They were asked to indicate their feelings about their psychological well-being by choosing appropriate questionnaire items. Only those students

who endorsed one of the extreme negative items (e.g., "I feel depressed a lot of the time.") were selected as subjects in the depressed group. (Five percent of students filling out the questionnaire endorsed one of these items.) The well-adjusted group was made up of students who did not endorse one of these items. Students were also administered the California Personality Inventory (Gough, 1956). Items from this inventory load on 18 scales. The "well-being" scale consists of items which assess feelings about self, sense of comfort with family and peers, and general satisfaction with direction of life. Obtaining a score of less than two standard deviations below the mean on the "well-being" scale was required for inclusion in the depressed group and obtaining a score higher than two standard deviations below the mean was required for inclusion in the well-adjusted group.

Procedure

Each subject was brought into an observation room and told that he would be observing four other students through a one-way mirror. After each action performed, he would be asked to evaluate how much he thought he would like the other person and to predict the other's future behavior.

The scales to be used for judgments of how much the subject would like the actor and for predictions of the actor's future behavior were explained first. The liking scale was a set of 12 wooden rings, 3.5 cm in diameter and .8 cm in width, mounted on a bar, 30 cm long (Anderson & Butzin, 1978). All the rings were pushed to the left of the bar initially.

The subject was told that the more he thought he would like the other, the more rings he should slide to the right.

The subject made predictions of the behavior of others by guessing how many minutes of experimental credit the other would give him. He was told that the other would be allowed to divide 15 minutes of credit (a course requirement and highly valued) between the subject and himself. The subject was told that for every time he guessed correctly he would receive an additional 5 minutes of credit. The subject recorded his responses on slips of paper numbered from 0 to 15 (Appendix K).

The experimenter told the subject that four individuals would perform each of two actions in the next room. The other four individuals were Duke undergraduates who were not known by the subject. They were confederates, instructed to perform as indicated below:

Experimenter (same for both actors): There are eight anagrams here which are unsolvable without these solutions. The more solutions you keep, the more money you'll make. The more solutions you give to the other person, the more money the other person will make. If you keep three-quarters of them, you'll make 50¢ and the other person will make 5¢. If you keep half of them, you'll make 20¢ and the other person will make 20¢. If you keep one-quarter of them, you'll make 5¢ and the other person will make 50¢.

Actor (High Nice): I think I'll give most of them to the other person.

Actor (Low Nice): Hmmm . . . 50¢. I think I'll keep most for myself.

The subject was then asked to indicate how much he thought he would like the other person and how many minutes of experimental credit he thought he would receive, by using each of the two rating scales.

The confederate then performed one of the following:

Experimenter (same for both actors): It is necessary that you and the person in the other room complete this grid (a series of numbers with empty boxes underneath them taken from the Digit Symbol subtest of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale; Wechsler, 1955) during this hour. It's up to you how much you complete and how much you leave for the person in the other room. It's okay as long as you fill in any. The person in the other room will have to fill in the rest.

Actor (High Nice): I think I'll fill in most of them. The person in the other room probably won't want to fill them in.

Actor (Low Nice): I think I'll just fill in a little. It really looks boring.

Subjects again made judgments of liking for the actor and predictions of the actor's future behavior. The same procedure was followed for the other three actors.

As in Experiment One, the two behaviors performed by the actors were constructed from a 2×2 (1st Information $\times$ 2nd Information) factorial design. The two levels of each factor were high (H) and low (L) levels of niceness. The two levels of niceness for the anagrams task were giving away most of the solutions (H) and giving away a couple (L). The two levels for the grid task were completing most of the grid (H) and a little of the grid (L). The first two actors performed the anagram task first and the second two actors performed the grid task first. Subjects observed the four actors in one of the following sequences: HL, HH, LL, LH; HH, LL, LH, HL; LL, LH, HL, HH; LH, HL, HH, LL.

Results

General evaluations of others. Subjects made judgments of each of four actors following the performance of each of two actions. Judgments of depressed and nondepressed subjects indicated that they used information initially presented in their first judgments, $F(1, 9) = 36.00$ and 30.38 , respectively. Figure 7 demonstrates that subjects attended to information presented initially and subsequently in their second judgments, $F(1, 9) = 15.67$ and 26.65 for depressed students, and 14.12 and 26.79 for nondepressed students.

There were no significant differences between the judgments made by depressed and nondepressed subjects for the first or second judgments.

Predictions of behavior. Depressed and nondepressed subjects used the first piece of information presented in their initial predictions of behavior, $F(1, 9) = 7.11$ and 29.67 , respectively. Both pieces of available information were used to make the second predictions, $F(1, 9) = 9.88$ and 23.21 for depressed students, and 15.48 and 6.55 for nondepressed students.

There was a marginally significant Adjustment $\times$ 1st Information $\times$ 2nd Information interaction, $F(2, 36) = 2.92$, $p < .07$, indicating that depressed and nondepressed subjects differed in their use of new information, depending on the valence of the information. Figure 8 indicates that depressed students averaged the two pieces of information available in making their predictions. For example, the actor who performed a




Figure 7. Mean Judgments of Liking: Experiment Two. The levels of 1st Information Presented are represented on abscissa. The two levels of 2nd Information Presented are represented by two separate lines in each panel.




Figure 8. Mean Predictions of Future Behavior: Experiment Two. The levels of 1st Information Presented are represented on abscissa. The two levels of 2nd Information Presented are represented by two separate lines in each panel.

"nice" action and a "not-nice" action was rated lower than the actor who performed two "nice" actions, but higher than the actor who performed two "not-nice" actions. The predictions of depressed students were consistently low unless the actor had performed only "nice" actions.

Discussion

This experiment found few differences in the interpersonal judgments of depressed and nondepressed students. The results were marginally significant and not in the predicted direction. Therefore, it is relatively likely that the findings are a result of chance factors. Nonetheless, the possible implications of the results are discussed below.

The marginally significant results indicate that depressed and nondepressed students in the present study used the behavioral information differently in making their predictions of future behavior. Depressed students seemed to integrate available data via an averaging rule. For example, if an actor performed a "nice" action and a "not-nice" action, the values of the two actions were averaged, yielding an intermediate value. It seems that nondepressed students did not use a simple averaging rule to integrate the information available to them. For example, they predicted that the actor who performed a "nice" action and a "not-nice" action would not give them much experimental credit. The actor who performed two "nice" actions was the only one of four stimulus actors predicted to give away much credit.

Several of the nondepressed students, but none of the depressed students, asked that the criteria they should use for predicting the behavior of others be explained. (These criteria were intentionally left to the subject's discretion.) Comments and individual response patterns suggested that at least several of the nondepressed subjects used deservingness criteria (e.g., he did most work, therefore he will take most reward), rather than niceness criteria (e.g., he was nice, therefore he probably will be nice).

These differences suggest that nondepressed students are more cautious about predicting positive behaviors of others than are depressed students. They require consistently positive information about others before they expect "nice" future behaviors. If this consistently positive information is available, their predictions are comparable to the predictions of depressed students.

An explanation for the "cautious" predictions of nondepressed students is suggested by their environment. The academic and social environment of these students is highly competitive. For example, the proportion of students aspiring to law and medical school is large, and the competitive fraternity-sorority system is a major force on campus. It seems that, in this environment, expectations that others will be competitive may be realistic. It may be realistic to assume that someone is doing something nice so that he will get something for it.

Depressed students were able to use some of the data available in

their predictions of behavior. However, they failed to use normative data which nondepressed students seemed to use. Nondepressed students based their judgments partially on the realistic expectation that others would be competitive. The problem presented by the failure of depressed students to use this information is that they may be frequently disappointed when their more positive expectations are not confirmed.

CHAPTER IV

GENERAL DISCUSSION

The results of the two experiments reported suggest that there are important differences in the social cognitions of well-adjusted and poorly adjusted individuals. The obtained results were quite different for the two poorly adjusted groups, when each was compared with its well-adjusted peer group. Rejected children made predictions of others which were less contingent on available behavioral information than the predictions of well-adjusted children. Depressed students used behavioral information more in their predictions than did nondepressed students, but this finding was only marginally significant.

The difference between well-adjusted and rejected children seems to be an important one. The rejected child uses available information less effectively in some interpersonal judgments. It seems that this breakdown in the ability to be a discriminating social judge must have serious interpersonal consequences. For example, if one fails to discriminate between others who like and dislike him, he will frequently approach those who dislike him and be rejected.

The failure to find significant differences in the interpersonal judgments of depressed and nondepressed students suggests that the tendency to become a less discriminating interpersonal judge is related to the level of the individual's psychological adjustment. The group of depressed college students was a very well-adjusted group when compared with the group of rejected children. Even though unhappy, these students are able to function academically and socially at a good university. While the procedures were different for the two experiments, the question "what will he do to you?" remained the same. It seems that, in response to this question, the non-depressed students were able to use and integrate available information to discriminate between actors. The rejected children became less discriminating in their social judgments under these circumstances.

A vulnerability model (Zubin & Spring, 1977) is proposed to account for this pattern of results. Individuals are proposed to differ in their propensity to become indiscriminating in their social judgments. Very poorly functioning individuals would be expected to become less discriminating in their judgments readily and across a wide range of circumstances. Well-adjusted individuals would be expected to become less discriminating only rarely. The rejected child might be seen as representing an intermediate point on this scale. While this child becomes less discriminating in his judgments, this may be only when his sense of self is invoked in his processing of data. The depressed student represents a point closer to the "well-functioning" end of this continuum. Available data were used effectively in this student's judgments.

Future Research

Experiment One demonstrated that rejected children make some of their interpersonal judgments differently from their well-adjusted peers. It was argued that rejected children may have different expectations of others which interfere with their processing of social data. However, there are other explanations for these findings. To differentiate between various explanations, a series of tasks could be administered to subjects which vary in the degree of personal involvement required by subjects, while controlling for other factors. Rejected children would be expected to be less discriminating in their social judgments to the extent that personal involvement was required. (See Discussion section of Chapter II for more complete discussion.)

Group differences demonstrated generally that rejected children make predictions of others differently from well-adjusted children. However, within this group of rejected children, there seemed to be different patterns of responding which might be linked to behavioral differences. In order to describe individual patterns of response, it is necessary to obtain several replications of data for individual subjects. These individual subject analyses would allow differentiation within the group of rejected children. For example, several of the rejected children seemed immature behaviorally, while several seemed depressed. Individual subject analyses might demonstrate that immature rejected children respond similarly to younger children, while depressed children respond non-contingently or with a negative bias.

A vulnerability model was proposed to explain differences between individuals of different levels of psychological adjustment. It was proposed that individuals differ in their propensity to become less discriminating social judges. The present results provide tentative support for this model. Further support could be provided through research with other populations. For example, schizophrenics, a very poorly functioning group, would be expected to become indiscriminating in their social judgments readily and across a wide range of tasks.

APPENDIX A

MEAN LIKING JUDGMENTS: EXPERIMENT ONE

		Second graders	Well-adjusted fifth graders	Rejected fifth graders
Time 1	L	4.3	5.6	5.45
	H	10.1	10.3	10.3
Time 2	LL	3.2	4.7	5.4
	LH	9.7	8.3	8.8
	HL	5.8	6.8	6.8
	HH	11.0	10.6	10.9
Time 3	LLH	6.7	7.0	7.8
	LHH	8.9	8.9	9.3
	HLH	9.0	9.3	8.8
	HHH	10.1	10.6	10.4

APPENDIX B

MEAN PREDICTIONS: EXPERIMENT ONE

		Second graders	Well-adjusted fifth graders	Rejected fifth graders
Time 1	L	6.25	5.25	6.25
	H	9.15	9.80	8.95
Time 2	LL	4.8	3.2	4.9
	LH	8.4	7.7	7.9
	HL	6.3	7.5	6.8
	HH	10.3	11.0	9.4
Time 3	LLH	5.8	5.4	7.0
	LHH	7.9	7.7	9.0
	HLH	7.8	9.0	8.7
	HHH	9.5	10.2	10.0

APPENDIX C

ANALYSES OF VARIANCE FOR LIKING JUDGMENTS FOR SECOND GRADERS AND FIFTH GRADERS: EXPERIMENT ONE

	Source	df	MS	F
Time 1	Age (A)	1	11.25	2.17
	1st Information (I)	1	551.25	83.59*
	A x I	1	6.05	.92
Time 2	Age (A)	1	.61	.12
	1st Information (I)	1	86.11	26.35*
	2nd Information (II)	1	456.01	98.75*
	A x I	1	.31	.10
	A x II	1	23.11	5.00*
	I x II	1	1.51	.41
	A x I x II	1	2.81	.77
Time 3	Age (A)	1	1.51	.20
	1st Information (I)	1	70.31	59.91*
	2nd Information (II)	1	52.81	19.04*
	A x I	1	.31	.27
	A x II	1	.13	.00
	I x II	1	3.61	4.70*
	A x I x II	1	.31	.41

Note. Listed degrees of freedom are for numerator; each source has its own error term with 18 degrees of freedom.

* $p < .05$.

APPENDIX D

ANALYSES OF VARIANCE FOR PREDICTIONS FOR SECOND GRADERS AND FIFTH GRADERS: EXPERIMENT ONE

	Source	df	MS	F
Time 1	Age (A)	1	.61	.05
	1st Information (I)	1	277.51	41.93*
	A x I	1	13.61	2.06
Time 2	Age (A)	1	.20	.02
	1st Information (I)	1	151.25	23.13*
	2nd Information (II)	1	304.20	37.10*
	A x I	1	22.05	3.37
	A x II	1	.20	.02
	I x II	1	.45	.11
	A x I x II	1	2.45	.58
Time 3	Age (A)	1	2.11	.20
	1st Information (I)	1	117.61	38.97*
	2nd Information (II)	1	66.61	5.24*
	A x I	1	7.81	2.59
	A x II	1	.11	.00
	I x II	1	2.81	.62
	A x I x II	1	.61	.14

Note. Listed degrees of freedom are for numerator; each source has its own error term with 18 degrees of freedom.

* $p < .05$.

APPENDIX E

ANALYSES OF VARIANCE FOR LIKING JUDGMENTS FOR REJECTED AND WELL-ADJUSTED CHILDREN; EXPERIMENT ONE

	Source	df	MS	F
Time 1	Social Status (SS)	1	.11	.02
	1st Information (I)	1	456.01	94.21*
	SS x I	1	.11	.02
Time 2	Social Status (SS)	1	2.81	.51
	1st Information (I)	1	78.01	19.18*
	2nd Information (II)	1	277.51	68.69*
	SS x I	1	1.01	.25
	SS x II	1	.12	.00
	I x II	1	1.01	.39
	SS x I x II	1	.31	.12
Time 3	Social Status (SS)	1	.31	.05
	1st Information (I)	1	46.51	41.40*
	2nd Information (II)	1	49.61	21.98*
	SS x I	1	4.51	4.02
	SS x II	1	.13	.01
	I x II	1	.31	.21
	SS x I x II	1	.61	.42

Note. Listed degrees of freedom are for numerator; each source has its own error term with 18 degrees of freedom.

* $p < .05$.

APPENDIX F

ANALYSES OF VARIANCE FOR PREDICTIONS FOR REJECTED AND WELL-ADJUSTED CHILDREN: EXPERIMENT ONE

	Source	df	MS	F
Time 1	Social Status (SS)	1	.11	.01
	1st Information (I)	1	262.81	69.75*
	SS x I	1	17.11	4.54*
Time 2	Social Status (SS)	1	.20	.02
	1st Information (I)	1	151.25	29.85*
	2nd Information (II)	1	231.20	41.58*
	SS x I	1	22.05	4.35*
	SS x II	1	7.20	1.29
	I x II	1	2.45	.42
	SS x I x II	1	.45	.08
Time 3	Social Status (SS)	1	7.20	.28
	1st Information (I)	1	96.80	24.98*
	2nd Information (II)	1	57.80	6.01*
	SS x I	1	14.45	3.73
	SS x II	1	.50	.01
	I x II	1	4.05	1.11
	SS x I x II	1	.20	.05

Note. Listed degrees of freedom are for numerator; each source has its own error term with 18 degrees of freedom.

* $p < .05$.

APPENDIX G

MEAN LIKING JUDGMENTS AND PREDICTIONS:
EXPERIMENT TWO

		Nondepressed students	Depressed students
<u>Judgments</u>			
Time 1	L	4.7	4.85
	H	7.4	7.25
Time 2	LL	3.4	3.2
	LH	6.2	6.6
	HL	5.7	5.4
	HH	7.9	7.8
<u>Predictions</u>			
Time 1	L	4.1	4.80
	H	6.65	6.95
Time 2	LL	4.4	3.3
	LH	5.4	7.2
	HL	4.9	5.2
	HH	7.8	8.3

APPENDIX H

ANALYSES OF VARIANCE FOR LIKING JUDGMENTS FOR DEPRESSED AND NONDEPRESSED COLLEGE STUDENTS: EXPERIMENT TWO

Source		df	MS	F
Time 1	Psychological			
	Adjustment (P)	1	.00	.00
	1st Information (I)	1	130.05	65.03*
	P x I	1	.45	.23
Time 2	Psychological			
	Adjustment (P)	1	.50	.00
	1st Information (I)	1	68.45	29.27*
	2nd Information (II)	1	145.80	53.12*
	P x I	1	.45	.19
	P x II	1	.80	.29
	I x II	1	3.20	1.95
	P x I x II	1	.20	.12

Note. Listed degrees of freedom are for numerator; each source has its own error term with 18 degrees of freedom.

* $p < .05$.

APPENDIX I

ANALYSES OF VARIANCE FOR PREDICTIONS FOR DEPRESSED AND NONDEPRESSED COLLEGE STUDENTS: EXPERIMENT TWO

Source		df	MS	F
Time 1	Psychological			
	Adjustment (P)	1	5.00	.59
	1st Information (I)	1	110.45	25.41*
	P x I	1	.80	.18
Time 2	Psychological			
	Adjustment (P)	1	2.81	.35
	1st Information (I)	1	43.51	23.93*
	2nd Information (II)	1	148.51	26.81*
	P x I	1	.12	.01
	P x II	1	12.01	2.17
	I x II	1	1.51	.48
	P x I x II	1	9.11	2.90

Note. Listed degrees of freedom are for numerator; each source has its own error term with 18 degrees of freedom.

* $p < .05$.

APPENDIX J

BRIEF PSYCHOLOGICAL INVENTORY USED FOR SELECTION OF DEPRESSED SUBJECTS IN EXPERIMENT TWO

Social Security No. _____

Section No. _____

The following questions ask you about how you feel about yourself.
Please endorse one response for each of the items.

1. a. I think I am well adjusted psychologically.
 b. I think I am fairly well adjusted psychologically.
 c. I think I am not very well adjusted psychologically.
2. a. I am happy much of the time.
 b. I am happy some of the time.
 c. I am seldom happy.
3. a. I enjoy activities with other people.
 b. Sometimes I like being with other people.
 c. I seldom like being with others.
4. a. I think most other people like me.
 b. I think some people like me and others do not.
 c. I don't think many people like me.
5. a. I hardly ever feel depressed.
 b. I feel depressed at times, but not too often.
 c. I feel depressed a lot of the time.
6. a. I'm pretty pleased with the direction of my life.
 b. I'm not too unhappy with the direction of my life.
 c. I'm not very happy with the direction of my life.

APPENDIX K

SCALE USED FOR PREDICTING ACTOR'S FUTURE
BEHAVIOR IN EXPERIMENT TWO

Minutes of experimental credit I expect other to give to me:

0---1---2---3---4---5---6---7---8---9---10---11---12---13---14---15

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